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International Humanitarian Law from
Agincourt to Rome
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O

VER THE PAST HALF-MILLENNIUM, the relationship between war and

law has been the subject of much change. Two issues have remained
central, even in modern international humanitarian law (IHL): the first is
"quarter," that is, the obligation to spare the life of a combatant who has laid
down his arms and surrendered, and, second, the protection of women from the
ravages of war and, especially, rape. Both issues arose during Henry V's
Agincourt campaign, a phase of the Hundred Years' War that started in 1415
with the landing of Henry's Army near Harfleur, the siege and capture of
Harfleur, and its victory in Agincourt, and ended in 1420 with the conclusion
of the Treaty of Troyes, which pronounced Henry the heir to the French
throne. At Agincourt, the terrain, the tactics, and the longbow helped the
lightly armed and mobile English prevail over the several times larger, heavily
armoured mounted French knights. The Treaty marked the ascendancy of
England until Joan of Arc's rallying of the French in 1429 sparked a turning
point that eventually led to the defeat of England by Charles VII of France.
This article is based on an inaugural lecture delivered on November 7, 1998, at the
Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva.
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International Humanitarian Law from Agincourt to Rome
This campaign was immortalized in Shakespeare's epic play, on which I shall
draw. I draw on Shakespeare because his anatomy of war is a close reflection of
the sixteenth century chronicles, Raphael Holinshed and Edward Hall, and
thus an excellent vehicle to illustrate the law's evolution. This apt point of de'
parture in assessing the current state of humanitarian law evidences an ap,
proach to the issue that may well prove instructive in implementing present
day IHL. Therefore, it is at Agincourt that the journey to Rome begins.
Medieval Law of War
I will start by describing briefly the law of war as it existed during the
Agincourt campaign. In the Middle Ages, chivalry was the principal normative
system providing a code of behaviour for knights, nobility, and the entire war,
ring class in the endemic wars in which they were involved. The humane and
noble ideals of chivalry included justice, loyalty, courage, honour, and mercy,
obligations of not killing or otherwise taking advantage of a vanquished enemy,
and keeping one's word, and duties of protecting the weak, especially women,
and helping people in distress. Seldom if ever realized in full, chivalry was a mLx
of reality, poetry, and legend. Despite humanizing warfare, chivalry also con'
tributed to the legitimization of war and, through ransom and pillage, provided
economic incentives for resorting to war.
The rules of chivalry were customary. However, various royal ordinances,
including Henry V's famous ordinances of war, codified some of these rules, in,
cluding those protecting women from rape and persons belonging to the
Church from capture and robbery. In addition, writers on chivalry compiled
treatises and manuals explaining the rules of chivalry, such as the duties to
grant quarter on the battlefield in exchange for ransom and to treat prisoners
humanely.
Chivalry's norms were fully applicable, regardless of nationality, between
knights and nobility but did not protect commoners and peasants and were not
applicable to non, Christians. Gentlemen were careful to avoid surrendering to
commoners and commoners to gentlemen. Rules were international but were
not class or religion neutral. They were enforced by courts of chivalry and mili,
tary courts, but-in contrast to our own-modem system of detailed Hague and
Geneva conventions-honour and shame played a critical role in enforce,
ment; the sanction of dishonour for the knight who violated his knightly duties
was quite effective. Although our generation has lost the sense of shame-con,
sider the slaughter and rape in Algeria-at least we have gained in universality:
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all men and women, of whatever class, religion or colour, are entitled to the full
protection of international humanitarian law.
Let me situate briefly chivalry in the medieval law of nations. Chivalry was
the jus annorum, or the law of arms, the special law of the knightly class paral,
leling such special laws as the law merchant or the law of the sea. It was a part of
the law of nations, or jus gentium, although the law of nations addressed also ad,
ditional subjects such as the privileges of ambassadors and the law of treaties.
Agincourt
From history, literature, and the films of Laurence Olivier and Kenneth
Branagh, most know the story of Agincourt, one of the rare great medieval bat,
tles during a period when wars were won or lost mostly by besieging fortresses
and cities. The massacre of the French prisoners of war in Agincourt, the flower
of French nobility and chivalry, is comprehensible only if we consider how out,
numbered the English forces were and how great their fear must have been. As
the battle wore on, the outnumbered English appeared to have the upper hand.
The fear that another French charge was about to begin, the presence on the
battlefield of a very large number of French prisoners who, though disarmed,
could have risen against their English captors, and the French attack on the
English rear camp possibly involving loss of life among the young boys guarding
the camp, all combined to trigger an unexpected order by the King. Shake,
speare's Henry cries out:
But hark, what new alarm is this same?
The French have reinforced their scattered men.
Then every soldier kill his prisoners.

But Shakespeare's Gower then responds to Fluellen's comment that it was
against the law of arms to kill the boys and explains the King's order as gener,
ated by the pillage of his treasures from the rear camp. He sarcastically adds
that the King ordered cutting the throat of prisoners, "O'tis a gallant king."
Shakespeare thus explains Henry's cruel order on two grounds: necessity, as
the French appeared to be regrouping to attack; and reprisal for the unlawful
attack on the servants guarding the rear camp and for its plunder.
The defence of reprisal was doubtful even at the time. The rear camp consti,
tuted a lawful military objective. It is far from certain that the pages guarding
the camp were entitled to the immunity of children. At least some medieval ju,
rists regarded non,combatant servants of an army, even when not involved in
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any fighting, as legitimate military objectives. What made the massacre even
more reprehensible, was that it was directed against prisoners. Yet some great
Renaissance jurists, such as Gentili, still justified reprisals against a collectivity.
Grotius dissented, "nature does not sanction retaliation except against those
who have done wrong. It is not sufficient that by a sort of fiction the enemy may
be conceived as forming a single body."
If the massacre of the prisoners was not justified as a reprisal, could it have
been justified on grounds of necessity? It may well be that the heavily outnum~
bered English would have had difficulty repelling another attack while guard~
ing their numerous prisoners. But this explanation is undercut by the fact that
the King decided to spare the highest ranking prisoners, whose ransom would
belong to him. Indeed, captors who were knights refused to carry out the order
and the King had to use 200 of his archers to carry out the gruesome task of
throat cutting.
Nevertheless, the eminent medieval jurist Giovanni da Legnano recognized
the captor's right to kill prisoners where there was fear of disturbance of the
peace; even the Renaissance scholar Vitoria prohibited killing of prisoners only
after victory had been won and all danger was over. Gentili, however, harshly
criticized the killing. NotWithstanding Gentili's condemnation, it cannot be
concluded that Henry clearly violated contemporary standards. Killing prison~
ers in an emergency was not unprecedented. While quarter was normally
granted in Anglo~French wars, the virtual absence of contemporary criticism of
Henry's action suggests that cruel as it was, his order did not violate the ac~
cepted norms of behaviour.
Even before the treaty of Rome, certainly under the jurisprudence of
Nuremberg, killing of prisoners of war, whether in the guise of reprisals or on
grounds of military necessity would be an absolute war crime. Yet, as recently as
during World War II, reprisal killing of innocent civilians in occupied territo~
ries was, in some circumstances, lawful. The Nuremberg tribunals ruled that
killing of civilian hostages in reprisal for hostile acts against the occupying
power was not a war crime provided that certain conditions were complied
with. Today, it would be a war crime under the Geneva Conventions and Pro~
tocols, and certainly under the Treaty of Rome with its explicit criminalization
of refusal to grant quarter.
But what about the killing of prisoners of war on grounds of necessity in
modem humanitarian law? Medieval chivalry, medieval ordinances of war and
humanist writings of Renaissance writers were followed by about two lean cen~
turies of humanitarian law. Two major challenges, one military, the other reli~
gious, forced a decline of chivalry without providing an effective substitute.
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Wars fought by large groups using long,range artillery were not conducive to
the pursuit and taking of prisoners or the once customary grant of quarter in ex,
change for ransom. And the emergence of Protestantism triggered an increas,
ing dehumanization of members of an adversary branch of Christianity, and
thus a fertile environment for the destruction of those regarded as subhuman.
Remember the massacre of Saint Bartholomew's Day or the outright killing by
the English of Spanish Armada sailors shipwrecked in Western Ireland.
By the mid,19th.century, the technology which precipitated the demise of
chivalry ultimately generated the need for international rules of war to human,
ize the conduct of hostilities, limit the killing and maiming, and ensure the hu,
mane care of prisoners, the sick and the wounded. The very scale of casualties
and of suffering required that this need be recognized. The American Civil
War generated the Lieber Code promulgated in 1863. The Lieber Code ulti,
mately spawned that branch of international humanitarian law commonly
known as the Hague law, which governs the conduct of hostilities. The Battle
of Solferino, along with Henry Dunant's moving portrayal of the suffering and
bloodshed at the battle inA Memory ofSolferino (1862) inspired the conclusion
of the First Geneva Convention (1864) as well as Geneva law more generally,
the other branch ofIHL which emphasizes the protection of victims of war, the
sick, the wounded, prisoners, and civilians. Since the mid, 19th Century, we
have been engaged in a period of intensive multilateral treaty making.
Both prongs of IHL-Hague and Geneva-drew their guiding principles
from chivalry. The obligations to use fairness and restraint, mercy and compas,
sion, in both offensive and defensive situations, have their origin in chivalric
honour.
In matters pertinent to military necessity, progress was nevertheless slow.
Those of us who consider Henry's order in Agincourt to be medieval and bar'
baric, should note that even the essentially humanitarian Lieber Code allowed
the denial of quarter to the enemy, that is, Confederate prisoners, on grounds
of necessity; "A commander is permitted to direct his troops to give no quarter
... when his own salvation makes it impossible to cumber himself with prison,
ers." This rule, which was law for the United States Army as recently as
mid, 19th Century, appears almost designed to legitimate the massacre Henry
V ordered at Agincourt.
Compare the modern U.S. Army Field Manual of 1956. It unequivocally
prohibits killing prisoners on grounds of self, preservation, in whatever
circumstances.
However, certain related questions of international humanitarian law are
less clear, especially whether in all circumstances there is a duty on a military
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unit to accept surrender and thus, in effect, grant quarter. In the abstract and
as a general principle, the obligation for a Party to a conflict to accept the sur~
render of enemy personnel and thereafter to treat them in accordance with the
Hague and the Geneva Conventions is categorical. In reality, problems con~
tinue to arise. A recent study states that the opinio juris of the United States is
that quarter may not be refused to an enemy who communicates an offer to sur~
render under circumstances permitting that offer to be understood and acted
upon by U.S. forces. A combatant who appears merely incapable or unwilling
to fight because he has lost his weapons or is retreating, but who has not com~
municated an offer to surrender is still subject to attack. And the 1992 U.S.
DOD report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War states:
There is a gap in the law of war in defining precisely when surrender takes effect
or how it may be accomplished in practical terms. Surrender involves an offer by
the surrendering party and an ability to accept on the part of his opponent. The
latter may not refuse an offer of surrender when communicated, but that
communication must be made at a time when it can be received and properly
acted upon-an attempt at surrender in the midst of a hard-fought battle is
neither easily communicated nor received. The issue is one of reasonableness.
The problem is thus not so much with the concept itself but with the nitty
gritty of the situational ability of the attacking force to accept surrender. What~
ever the black letter of the law, soldiers will not want to risk their own lives in
granting quarter. Hopefully, the ICRC study o( customary rules ofhumanitar~
ian law will be able to advance the proposition that quarter must be given even
when the safety of the captor is endangered by the presence of the captured
combatants. But this is an area where a return to a culture of values, and espe~
cially honour, is necessary if we want better compliance with the rules. Only
when it is realized that killing a surrendering enemy is shameful will we see
progress.
Protection of Women
I tum to my second theme, protection of women. License to rape was con~
sidered a major incentive for the soldier involved in medieval siege warfare.
While urging generals to forbid and prevent rape during the sacking of a city,
Vitoria reluctantly admitted the lawfulness of allowing soldiers to sack a city if
the "necessities of war" required it or "as a spur to the courage of troops," even
when this involved rape. These cruel rules were, however, rejected by Gentili.
Anticipating international criminal tribunals, Gentili wrote that if the enemy
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who allows rape is not punished by God, he will have to render an account to
other sovereigns.
Henry V's ordinances of war prohibited rape and imposed capital punish,
ment on offenders. Enforcing compliance was a major problem, however. In his
famous speech at the walls of Harfleur, Shakespeare's Henry enumerates the
dreadful abuses-including rape, denying quarter, killing non,combatants, ,
children and women-that his troops will commit in the city if it refuses to sur,
render. How could these dire threats be reconciled with the existing and
emerging norms protecting women from the ravages of war? The distinction in
medieval law between the treatment of both combatants and civilians in cap'
tured territory or on the battlefield, on the one hand, and their treatment in a
besieged city or fortress that was taken by assault, on the other, suggests an ex,
planation. Unmitigated brutality was reserved for the population of a city that
refused to surrender.
Henry, the commander, tells Harfleur that he will no longer be able to con'
trol his forces if it does not surrender, and that the leaders of Harfleur will bear
the responsibility for the resulting brutality. Of course, Shakespeare emphasizes
rape and its sheer horror. But in a speech which attracted feminist censure, his
Henry clearly places the responsibility on Harfleur should it resist his ultima'
tum. In terms of realpolitik, Henry tells Harfleur: "If you do not deal now with
me, your one protector able only for a time to maintain discipline among this
terrifying force, the force will run amok according to base human nature and I
cannot be responsible for the consequences." But such arguments by their very
nature are likely to incite illegal conduct by the troops, and these claims of the
inevitable breakdown of discipline are thus both an evasion of the moral re,
sponsibility that should continue even into battle, and affirmative encourage,
ment to unrestrained war.
In modem international law, despite the prohibition of rape in the Lieber
Code, the protection of women's rights to physical and mental integrity does
not appear to have been a priority. The Hague Regulations provide only indi,
rect protection against rape. The 1929 Geneva POW Convention contained a
general provision too vague to afford effective protection to women prisoners.
During the Second World War, rape was tolerated and even utilized in some
instances as an instrument of policy. In occupied Europe and in the occupied
Far East, tens of thousands of women were subjected to rape and forced to en,
ter brothels for Nazi and Japanese troops. Rape was not prosecuted in
Nuremberg, though it was in the Far East. Only in the Fourth Geneva Conven,
tion of 1949 was an unequivocal prohibition of rape established. Even so, viola,
tion of this prohibition was not listed among the grave breaches of the
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Convention which require prosecution or extradition. Finally, it took the mass
rape in the former Yugoslavia, so well publicized by the media, followed by
widespread rape in Rwanda, to generate rapid changes.
International humanitarian law does not develop in a rational and gradual
way. It develops spasmodically in response to atrocities. It is a pity that calami~
tous events are needed to shock the public conscience into focusing on ne~
glected areas of the law. The more offensive the occurrence, the greater the
pressure for rapid adjustment. Nazi atrocities, for example, led to the establish~
. ment of the Nuremberg tribunals, the evolution of the concepts of crimes
against peace, crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide, the shaping
of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and the birth of the human rights move~
ment. The starvation of Somali children prompted the Security Council to ap~
ply Chapter VII of the Charter to an essentially internal situation, bringing
about a revolutionary change in our conception of the role of the Security
Council to enforce peace in such situations.
The Hague and Rwanda Tribunals
Instant reporting from the field has resulted in rapid sensitization of public
opinion, greatly reducing the time lapse between the perpetration of such trag~
edies and responses to them. It took the repeated and massive atrocities in the
former Yugoslavia and then in Rwanda to persuade the Security Council to es~
tablish the two ad hoc criminal tribunals and to start the momentum towards
the establishment of a standing international criminal court. The statutes of
the ad hoc tribunals criminalized rape as a crime against humanity. At the same
time, both the ICRC and the United States started interpreting the grave
breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions as encompassing rape.
The Hague Tribunal has issued several important decisions that clarify and
give judicial imprimatur to some rules of international humanitarian law. It has
made a real contribution to the elucidation of crimes against humanity and to
establishing that customary law war crimes apply also to non~international
armed conflicts. Let us remember that as recently as 1949, the Geneva Con~
ventions contained only one article-common Article 3-which addressed
non~international armed conflicts. Until the mid~90's, its violation was consid~
ered not to involve individual criminal responsibility.
The Rwanda tribunal has issued important decisions on its competence and
on genocide. The work of both tribunals demonstrates that international in~
vestigations and prosecutions of persons responsible for serious violations of in~
ternational humanitarian law are possible. These developments have created a
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positive environment for the establishment of the standing international crimi~
nal court.
Rome
One is struck by three aspects of the scope of crimes under international hu~
manitat:ian law as it has emerged from the work of the diplomatic conference in
Rome. First, most governments appeared ready to accept an expansive concep~
tion of customary international law without much supporting practice. Second
is an increasing readiness to recognize that some rules of IHL once considered
to involve only the responsibility of States may also be a basis for individual
criminal responsibility. There are lessons to be learned here about the impact of
public opinion on the formation of opinio juris and customary law. The ICRC
study of customary rules ofIHL, now in progress, will further reinforce these de~
velopments. Third, the inclusion in the ICC Statute of common Article 3 and
crimes against humanity, the latter divorced from a war nexus, connotes a cer~
tain blurring of IHL with human rights law and thus an incremental
criminalization of serious violations of human rights. It goes without saying that
the type of offenses encompassed by common Article 3 and crimes against hu~
manity are virtually indistinguishable from ordinary human rights violations. I
note that we have witnessed a rapid transition of many principles and rules of
IHL from the rhetorical to the normative, and from the merely normative to
the effectively criminalized.
These developments could not have taken place without a powerful new co~
alition driving the criminalization of offenses against the IHL. Much like the
earlier coalition that stimulated the development of both a corpus of interna~
tional human rights law and the mechanisms involved in its enforcement, this
new coalition includes scholars who promote and develop legal concepts and
give them theoretical credibility, NGO's that provide public and political sup~
port and means of pressure, and various governments that spearhead
law~making efforts in the United Nations.
The adoption of the Rome Statute of the ICC on July 17,1998, is an event of
major historical importance. Although it is still too early to assess the prospects
of the effectiveness of the Court and many aspects of its Statute, this is not the
case with regard to the definition of crimes against international humanitarian
law contained in Articles 6-8. These articles, now part of treaty law, not only
constitute the principal offenses that the ICC will try, but they will take on a
life of their own as an authoritative and largely customary statement of interna~
tional humanitarian and criminal law. As such, they may become a model for
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national laws to be enforced under the principle of universality of jurisdiction.
They will thus have great influence on practice and doctrine even before the
Statute enters into effect.
Regarding the crime of genocide, the Statute tracks the 1948 Convention.
The article defining crimes against humanity is the first multilateral treaty defi,
nition of crimes against humanity. It is independent of any nexus with war.
There are many additions to the Nuremberg list of crimes against humanity.
Crimes ,added or developed include rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution,
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any form of sexual violence of com'
parable gravity. Rape and other sexual offences against women have been in,
cluded in all of the sections of war crimes.
For non,international armed conflicts, the Statute declares criminal serious
violations of common Article 3 and also contains a significant list of
Hague,type war crimes. This recognition of war crimes under customary law as
pertinent to non,international armed conflicts represents a significant
advance.
The definitions of crimes are now in place. It is up to the States to make
them effective, to punish violators and to deter future crimes. Recent atrocities
in Kosovo should make us realize that adoption of treaties and statutes is not
enough; without effective enforcement, prospects of deterrence will continue
to be poor.
Let me conclude with a broad reflection. We now have a system of Geneva
Conventions that have obtained the formal assent of virtually all States. The
Conventions give us exact language, and clarity, at least for the initiated. \Ve
have created a complicated and technical system of humanitarian law that only
experts can master. It is true that this system has not prevented the continuing
growth of customary rules, to add, to modify, and to fill in the interstices of con,
ventions. The jurisprudence of the Hague tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
provides a salutary example of this process. Although the teleological aspects of
humanitarian law facilitate the continuing creation of customary law through
emphasis on opinio juris, nonetheless, international humanitarian law is primar,
ily conventional.
A normative system, like chivalry, based largely on custom and a few rules of
relative generality, would not suffice in the face of the frequent disintegration
of States, the multiplicity of powerful actors on the domestic and international
scene, and the modern weapons and technology. However, through this pro'
cess 'of treaty,making, of codification, vital and necessary as it is, we may have
lost the sense that rules arise naturally out of societies. We may have lost the
flexibility that came from rules of essentially customary character. And finally,
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we may have forgotten the value attaching to honour, chivalry and mercy. In
conflicts around the world, people not only kill and rape, they are proud of their
deeds.
We must revive our ability to feel shame and guilt. We have to create a cul~
ture of individual responsibility. Utopian attempts to revive chivalry would
have little effect. But, to make international humanitarian law truly effective,
we need to reinvigorate chivalry's culture of values, especially the notion of in~
dividual honour and dishonour as motivating factors for the conduct of both
warriors and citizens. Treaties alone will not ensure respect for fundamental
norms.
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